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METAPSYCHOLOGY OF THE INFANT BODY:
PSYCHO-ANALYTIC AESTHETICS
RECONSIDERED
CHARLES LEVIN
1: THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE PAIN PRINCIPLE IN FREUD AND KLEIN
I have been asked to say something about the body in pieces, and I thought that the best way
to begin might be to try to situate the phrase "body-in-pieces" itself in roughly the way that
psychoanalysis might see it. I shall take it for granted that the metaphor of the body in pieces
has some relation to the making of art objects, and the ways in which we frame aesthetic ex-
perience. My principle concern tonight is with psychoanalytic conceptions of the psychic
process, and how these mayor may not be useful for aesthetics in general.J My central con-
clusion will be that, contrary to psychoanalytic opinion, the mind never is and never was a
unitary phenomenon, that is a sort of nucleus of drives or needs which gradually develop into
demands and desires, egos, superegos, and secondary processes, such as perception, cognition,
feeling, willing, and acting. I shall argue that from the very beginning of life, in what I have
come to describe as the infantile body, the mind is essentially an aesthetic phenomenon aris-
ing from the corporeal experience of multiplicity and difference. In short, a phrase like the
"body-in-pieces" provides as good a description as any of the basic substance or condition of
the psychic process. In order to establish this point, however, I shall have to spend some time
trying to distinguish the aesthetic dimension of psychic life from central metapsychological
concepts in Freudian and Kleinian psychology.
The phrase "body-in-pieces" is obviously inspired in some way by the psychoanalytic
paradigm, but what does it actually signify from a psychoanalytic point of view? The short
answer for most people would I assume be something like violence: the body in pieces presup-
poses an act of aggression, or a destructive wish, or some sort of fantasy about tearing a thing
to pieces, whether it be the self or the object is not immediately clear. The importance of
Melanie Klein's views on these matters is obvious, but before we discuss her work, I would
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like to say a few words about Freud himself, as a way of introducing Klein's ideas. The central
theme of Melanie Klein's thought is the work of mourning and reparation, or the problem of
how to make up for the destruction of the object. This emphasis on the internal consequences
of aggression may be seen as a development of Freud's insight that psychic life entails a con-
stant process of disruptive change: the psyche is forever moving in cycles, which begin with a
cathexis (or libidinal investment), followed by some degree of withdrawal, and then recathex-
is. Libidinal-emotional commitments are continuously being threatened and sometimes they
are irreparably shattered. In his discussion of the Schreber case, Freud spoke of the narcissis-
tic neuroses, or what we now call psychosis, in this way: he thought of psychosis as a near
complete withdrawal of interest in the real world, and he postulated that sometimes the
wildest delusions are actually attempts by the psychotic to relibidinize the object, to reestab-
lish emotional links with the external environment. What Freud was at first slow to recog-
nize about this, at least at the official level of general psychological theory (or what he
christened metapsychology), was that the inevitable experience of abandonment and the
painful process of withdrawing and regrouping emotional investments naturally stirs up a
sizable reservoir of aggressive feeling in the human soul. And to the destabilizing effects of
loss in general may be added Freud's eventual emphasis on the apprehension or anticipation
of separation from the object, and the attendant anxieties, that is, the fear of narcissistic
injury, as in castration anxiety, and fear of loss of love. These very fundamental concerns are
normally overlooked in the popular and academic literature on Freud's achievements. But
Freud thought that this anticipatory mode of being, this sense of impending emotional or
narcissistic catastrophe, though not necessarily always realistic, must nevertheless somehow
be thematically foundational of human experience. In Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety, he
speculated about the relation between trauma, and particularly the possibility of birth trau-
ma - the primal form of separation - and something like what Heidegger in the following
year called 'Being-toward-Death'; and in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, of course, he gathered
these problems together around the concept of a primary anti-libidinal force, a sort of chthon-
ic biophysical deposit of the aggressive instinctual drives - the death instinct. In nearly all of
his writings, from the beginning of the First World War, when he wrote "On Narcissism';
until the beginning of the Second, when he died, not long after publishing the profoundly
pessimistic "Psychoanalysis Terminable and Interminable'; Freud steadily shifted emphasis
from sexuality to aggression. In adopting the mantle of increasingly stoical realism - an
attitude compounded by numerous operations on his cancerous jaw - he seemed to assume
that the facts of impermanence, separation, and loss may all be counted on to provoke a
continuous stream of defensive and controlling activities or fantasies, often of a highly de-
structive nature, and this is the key to almost everything that Melanie Klein wrote.
So what began at the outset, in Freud's earliest psychological writings, as a sophisticated
kind of nineteenth century reductionist psychology of pleasure and pain evolved finally into a
grand scheme of cosmic forces: Eros and Thanatos, the life instincts and the death instincts,
the sexual drives and the aggressive drives. To the pleasure principle and the reality princi-
ple, Freud added the more fundamental idea of a repetition compulsion and a tendency to
return to an original, inorganic state of nonstimulation and rest. It is worth pausing here in
order to examine these concepts more carefully. What did Freud originally mean by the plea-
sure principle, and why did he come to subotdinate it to the constancy principle and the
death instinct? When I have answered this question, I hope you will see that Freud never
really had a theory based on pleasure, and that what little insight into the nature of pleasure
we do have was already reduced in the psychoanalytic project to the status of a secondary
effect of the dynamics of pain. This subjugation is evident from the very beginning in Freud's
Project in 1895 and The Interpretation ofDreams at the turn of the century.
In these founding texts, and particularly in Chapter Seven of The Interpretation ofDreams,
Freud proposed the first metapsychology of the infantile body, and it has remained the most
influential one ever since, especially in the behaviouristic and social sciences. Ultimately, it is
a model which identifies culture with linguistic mediation. Freud conceives the body-with-
out-language according to the scheme of a reflex arc, and builds the psyche up from there.
The basic aim of the "primitive psychic apparatus'; as he called it, or reflex arc, is to reduce
the unpleasure of drive tension through discharge. This is what Freud meant by the constan-
cy principle: pleasure is defined in dependent relation to constancy as the negative of drive
pressure; it arises from the diminution of stimulus innervation, and may be understood as an
approximate return of the enlivened organism to the optimal level of inertia. In this formula-
tion of the pleasure principle, pain is always the given. One cannot have life and especially
psychic life without drive experience, and drive experience, when left to itself, naturally pro-
ceeds on a gradient toward excess stimulation, which must be siphoned off before it generates
so much unpleasure as to overwhelm the organism. Pleasure, on the other hand, is really just
a by-product of the discharge of excess stimulation, a contingency of the regulatory demand
for 'drive reduction' (the constancy principle). In Chapter Seven of The Interpretation of
Dreams, Freud illustrated these ideas most vividly in his little vignette about the hungry
baby. The key to the hungry baby story is that the organism is essentially reactive. Pleasure-
seeking and stimulus-seeking activities are explained as secondary derivative phenomena, or
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sublimations, by means of the reality principle (not the pleasure principle), of the phylogeneti-
cally primary impulse to avoid pain. Thus the desire for pleasure is a much later development,
an offshoot, of the hatred of pain.
If pain is defined as stimulation, it is really not such a long step from the so called plea-
sure principle to the death instinct after all. What remains constant throughout Freud's
oeuvre is precisely his emphasis on the constancy principle, the idea that the organism is
always striving to reduce stimulation. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the pleasure
principle was originally, and more accurately, termed the unpleasure principle by Freud. Just
to avoid any further confusion, I would suggest we call it the pain principle. So long as we
remain within the parameters of classical metapsychology, we are really obliged to set the
problem of pleasure aside, and to place a question mark beside it.
In connection with this, there is another matter of interpretation we should consider as
well; there is a case to be made, I think, that what I am now calling the pain principle is
essentially a retroactive extrapolation of the epistemological presuppositions of the reality
principle. The aim of the pain principle is to discharge drive tension; but the purpose of the
reality principle is to do just that - only in a more expedient and pragmatic fashion. What is
'real' about the reality principle is that, at a certain cost in terms of delay and effort, it actual-
ly gets things done: it satisfies the drive, but in a way which minimizes potentially painful
side effects of gratification. From this point of view, the pain principle is the reality princi-
ple's false start. One might even aver that the pain principle is just the reality principle
minus practical learning. So if there is indeed a privileged psychoanalytic insight into the
nature of pleasure, it is nevertheless difficult to distinguish logically and developmentally
from the reality principle as Freud originally defined it.
Freud's use of the hungry baby model was intended to illustrate the basic mechanism of
the dream, that is, the thesis of hallucinatory wish-fulfilment which, incidentally, is so cen-
tral to the psychoanalytic understanding of art. The question arises as to the internal state of
the baby when it kicks and screams with hunger, and cries to no avail. Freud's answer was
that this motor pattern of discharge is temporarily short-circuited, and the organism switches
into reverse, in regressive flight from the painful stimulus to the memory end of the reflex
apparatus, where the lingering trace of previous gratification is cathected, that is, the baby
hallucinates a feed. In the absence of the real breast, the baby fantasizes one in a vain but
momentarily effective attempt to ward off the unpleasurable internal stimulus. Thus we see
that the drive puts pressure on the psychic apparatus to bring about satisfaction, which for
the neonate is largely up to the environment. When the environment fails, the hungry baby
has no recourse but to resort to 'plan B': to hallucinate the fulfilment of the demand for nour-
ishment - in effect to fantasize without a frame. (The alternative, of course, is to withdraw
completely - to fall asleep, and perchance to dream.) So according to Freud (who always man-
aged to warn that there is an element of fiction, or fantasy, in these thought experiments of
his), the hallucinatory gratification experience of the hungry baby is the blueprint of the in-
ternal world, and the beginning of psychic life.
Notice that in all these metapsychological speculations, the psychic apparatus has no
object. In fact, the absence of the object in the primitive psychic infrastructure is the basic
premise of classical metapsychology. Of course, every drive must have an object, and in the
case of the hungry baby, it is obviously the mother's tit; but according to Freud, there is no
awareness of this on the part of the baby until well into the evolution of the reality principle,
when word-presentations and conscious perception have consolidated their hold on the sur-
face layers of the mind. Until then, reality testing is absent, and the drive presses unchecked
toward discharge; even the perception of the object, i.e., the breast, cannot be told apart from
the memory of it. So the organism, though itself an open biological system, turns out to be
inhabited and governed by an apparatus which is essentially closed - paradoxically, the
psyche itself - which always tends to return to the illusory, self-sufficient, omnipotent state
Freud termed primary narcissism.
I should just mention in passing that the influence of this developmental model is quite
pervasive. Academic discussion in the humanities has been dominated for some time now by
the assumption that psychic life begins in narcissistic self-enclosure and proceeds only
through the shaping contingencies of the environment, particularly language, toward differ-
entiation, perception, and communication. The perennial effort to. explain art and culture as
ideological effects of socio-economic relations and conditions was originally a precursor of the
drive-defence model, and has since, in its more modern, sophisticated versions, become a
variation of it. Something like this might also be said about the current vogue of explaining
subjectivity as a metaphysical derivative of primary 'material' forces like the will to power,
desire, production, or differance. Marx's philosophy of production, with its hierarchy of base
and superstructure, maps quite easily onto Nietzsche's philosophy of will, with its two-tier
model of power and sign; and the two together easily combine with the pain-sublimation
theory of culture which Freud elaborated in his later years.
We began with the suggestion that it was Melanie Klein who worked out the piecemeal con-
cept of the body for psychoanalysis, and we have just reviewed the groundwork which Freud
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laid for her. To the extent that there is, as I have attempted to demonstrate, a continuity of
conceptual structure from Freud's pain principle to the death instinct, Klein was faithful to
the implications of classical metapsychology. Her originality lies in the fact that from very
early on, the late nineteen twenties at least, she was learning how to read the object back into
the conventional account of psychodynamics. Turning Freud somewhat upside down, she
reinterpreted the pain principle as a kind of flight from the self, toward the object. The issue
was no longer just the way in which unpleasure mobilized psychic energy to cathect memo-
ries into vivid but illusory experiences of gratification; drive frustration for Klein came to
mean the hopelessness of the fragmented self, in its struggle to establish inside itself the elu-
sive wholeness and bounty of the object; and Freud's problem of distinguishing reality from
hallucinations became the Kleinian problem of reconstructing or repairing the internal object
(i.e., the good memory) which has been damaged by greed and envy (or what Lacan would
call "desire").
William Bouguereau, Retut"n from the Harvest, 1878 (detail).
There is no doubt that in all this, pain remains the over-riding consideration. Klein's
infantile body is congenitally fragmented and disoriented by the paranoid-schizoid structure
of defense against unpleasure, which are typically splitting and projective identification. The
Kleinian baby attributes the problem of unpleasure directly to the object. As Freud had said:
"Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love. It derives from the narcissistic ego's primor-
dial repudiation of the external world with its outpouring of stimuli" 0915, 139). Freud
called this phenomenon the "pure pleasure ego'; but note again its reactive quality: the plea-
sure ego is really the discharge, expulsion, or projection of pain.
Klein's contribution was to interpolate into this model the cognitive and emotional fac-
tors which Freud - and the hunger scenario of psychic life - had presupposed, but whose im-
plications he had failed to elaborate (the psychological science of his day had constrained
Freud to attribute the so called secondary processes to a later stage of development).
Unfortunately, the more the baby knows, and the more it is able to feel, the more painful are
the consequences of its helplessness, and the more destructive are its thoughts. The result is
that the hungry baby's hallucination of satisfaction blossoms, in the writings of Melanie
Klein, into an entire psychomachia of ornate fantasies about invading and controlling the
object from inside. The splitting off of painful, bad object experiences leads to paranoid fears
of retaliation and schizoid withdrawal, which in turn threaten the good and pleasurable
object experiences, which cannot be maintained indefinitely in a state of idealized circum-
scription. At about six months, or roughly when academic psychology now dates the major
breakthrough in preverbal development, Klein postulated the onset of a new phase of emo-
tional growth concerned with the problem of reparation. In the depressive position, as she
called it, the infant finally masters the agony of nonsatisfaction by consolidating a good
internal object: the good breast, as she sometimes described it.
Thus, in contradistinction to Freud, and the whole range of mainstream academic
psychology, from Watson and Skinner to Piaget, Klein always presupposed the object, even
during the first few months of life. There is still narcissism and confusion, of course, but
Klein's baby is no longer conceived as a psychological isolate. Just as the paranoid schizoid
position can be interpreted as an object-libidinal elaboration of the pain principle, the de-
pressive position is like a second edition of the reality principle. The burden of motivation
shifts from instinct to emotion, and from aim to object. As we saw earlier, Freud's line of
reasoning was pragmatic: the pain principle sets the agenda and what follows is essentially
a programme of realism and expediency. To this Klein added a kind of object principle: the
morality of the depressive position and its object of reparation.
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The object of reparation is the centrepiece of Melanie Klein's contribution to psychoan-
alytic aesthetics (SegaI1947, 190). The Kleinian problematic of creativity and aggression in
relation to the internal object is well worth studying, and I would recommend in particular
a reading of Marion Milner (950) and Anton Ehrenzweig (967). In the meantime, you will
already have sutmised that the unconscious meaning of aesthetic activity for Klein is not
just the sublimation of the instincts; it is also, as for Lacan, the search for the lost object, al-
though for Klein the latter is not so much the impossible object of desire, the objet petit a, as
the object that was destroyed in imagination before it could be fully experienced as part of
the self.
Let us just pause for a moment to reflect on what we have so far. I have offered you two
myths, both of them very well known through their popularizations, about the nature of the
creative impulse, and the pleasure in art and cultural form. The first has to do with [he
human transcendence of nature and necessity, and the way in which the exigencies of life are
compensated through the derivative pleasures of sublimation (at bottom, the hungry baby's
hallucination). This is quintessential Freud, though it is encapsulated nowhere more suc-
cinctly than in Ernst Kris's 0952, 177) phrase, "regression in the service of the ego." The sec-
ond involves a morality tale in which the paranoid attack on the object is symbolically
redeemed through the reparative struggle to establish wholeness and harmony - to reinte-
grate experience (overcome splitting) and to recognize the independence and autonomy of the
object - the object which of course every subject creates, perhaps inadvertently at first, but in
the end always deliberately (Klein, 1975; Segal, 1981).
Now, I would like to ask the question: can psychoanalysis provide a genuine alternative
to the pain-psychologies of Freud and Klein, an alternative to the view of the aesthetic as a
compensatory sublimatory discharge of instinctual pressure and as a reparative atonement for
destruction of the object? There is no doubt that art has practical and moral dimensions, but
the aesthetic dimension of art is concerned chiefly with experience, with qualities of sensa-
tion, perception, gesture, movement, vitality, and above all those affective and cognitive
surges through which the body directly translates itself into the psychical process. And yet,
if the pleasure principle turns out to be the pain-reality principle in disguise, and if the lost
object is perpetually returning in the ghostly form of a penance-demanding superego, with
what means are we left to conceptualize the aesthetic dimension in psychoanalytic terms? Is
there a dynamic cross-section of the aesthetic moment which is not merely a mechanism for
the expression of motivational forces like pain and guilt?
2: THE BODY AND THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT
In his contribution to Mikel Dufrenne's UNESCO compendium on aesthetics, Jean-Francois
Lyotard (-1978) has touched on this question indirectly. Lyotard defines 'expression', in classi-
cal fashi~n, as "the presence in the secondary process ... of operations pertaining to the
unconscious system': Expression, he says, "is present when the signifier of the work cannot
be translated into the language that ptovides the interpretive commentary" (1979, 136). This
quality of untranslatability - of resistance to metalinguistic reformulation and abstraction -
provides the basis for what Lyotard has called the "figural'; a largely neglected term which,
like Baudrillard's "symbolic exchange'; emerges through opposition to the conventional for-
malism of semio-linguistic discoutse. Lyotard argues that Freud intuitively perceived "the
primacy of the figure, of an arrangement of the parts of an object which cannot be deduced
from the laws of the structute to which it belongs .. :' 037-8). This is, of course, the territory
of dreams, or what Lewin called the dream-screen: the expressive figure reveals another kind
of meaning, deriving from "another scene'; which is not that of ordinary language or represen-
tation, but of the wish, or the 'original fantasy' - the /antasme originaire (Laplanche & Leclaire
1960).
Now, if we think again of the figure of the "body-in-pieces" we may discern, in the light of
Lyotard's reading of Freud, that the term 'pieces' cannot refer to the body as an organic com-
bination of parts and functions, of which the mind would be one bit which can be prostheti-
cally exteriorized like any other, in McLuhanesque fashion. Because they are figural in
expression, the parts of the unintegrated body resist derivation from the totality which they
comprise and to which they belong. Their meaning is neither the function of an organic
whole nor the differential determination of a 'system'. They do not compose a language. The
body from this point of view is like an activity with the quality of a substance - a "body in
the act of becoming'; as Bakhtin says - not a narrative sequence but a sensuous dynamic
without structure. Of course, the perceptual, cognitive, and affective contents of bodily pro-
cesses interact and relate, and in that sense, they generate aesthetic form - but they do not
bring the object under the guidance of a concept (Kant 1790). This may be said of all
moments of sublime shock: whether they pertain to feelings of love, terror, disgust, desire, or
serene peace, they will have the psychological structure of aesthetic perception in relation to
the 'found object' (cf. Fairbairn 1938; 1939). That is, the area of coincidence between the
'internal world' and 'external reality' becomes very large, as in the case ofWinnicott's "transi-
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tional object"2: somehow perception and projection have intersected in such a way as to cre-
ate a focus of mutually reinforcing intensity.
When we find a leg or a head or a mass of entrails among the scattered remains of a
corpse, we are horrified because we are stumbling upon something within, as if what'were
homely and therefore unnoticed in ourselves were suddenly flung out into the street where
anyone might trip over it. Even horror is intimate (Freud 1919) and this is not just due to the
fact that we have destroyed our internal objects in "phantasy'; as the Kleinians would say, and
then encountered the remains; or that we have identified with the victim and the dismember-
er and felt their suffering or guilt. When we talk about processes like introjection and projec-
tion - when we entertain the fiction of objects interacting inside a purely subjective space -
we are also talking about a dimension of life, remote as it may be from the consciousness of
everyday life, in which the experience of the body as a loose collection of parts and functions
is deeply familiar and satisfying - a recurring and expected event - not merely the alienated
product of conflict and aggression. The reports of the medical examiner and the story of the
Ripper and his victims come later.3 They are secondary elaborations, like all formulations of
the ego and the superego.
The same may be said of the carnivalesque body which Bakhtin has described in his
study of Rabelais. Perhaps the aesthetics of Grotesque revelry can be explained away as phe-
nomena peculiar to pre-capitalist formation; but whether or not we accept the proposition
(not Bakhtin's) that desublimated carnality is a construct belonging to another age - the fad-
ing effect of a defunct cultutal code - we are still left with the possibility that behind the
dialectic of social forms, the celebration of the detotalized body expresses a transhistorical
psychic reality rooted in infant experience, and not engendered by anything remotely "histor-
ical" in the academically understood senses of the term (including theories about breast-feed-
ing and toilet-training).
At some point, perception of the body ceases to be narrative in form, and passes over into
some other way of organizing experience. In the analysis of all experience, including the expe-
rience of analysands on analytic couches, there is an irreducible aesthetic residue, which can-
not be read off from theory (Lyotard's reeits), and doesn't survive codification into theory -
present case included. In fact, it is precisely what doesn't carry over - what is immediat'e and
untranslatable - which makes the transference (i.e., human sociability) so rich a source of in-
formation about fundamental psychological processes.
To illustrate this, we need to show that it is possible to extend Freud's concept of
'psychic reality' beyond the horizon of Klein's object-relational account of the internal world
under the domination of the pain principle. We need somehow to take account of the 'figural'
as a dimension of embodiment: that the unintegrated fragments of the body have insides of
their own, sustained by their conflictual engagements with outsides which might, in their
turn, be insides as well, in relation to other parts.
Let us take the skin as an example, since it is primarily in terms of the skin as an organis-
mic boundary that cultures define the spatial (and emotional) concepts of containment and
exclusion. Like the other senses, the skin is of course an extension of the brain; but it also
wraps the body in a penumbra of nervous tissue. It is important to grasp that the containing
function of the body and its parts is more than a metaphor of external boundaries. The skin
itself is part of the psychic apparatus (Bick 1968), highly differentiated in its own right, with
active areas, of which the mouth, the anus, and the genitals are only the most codified in psy-
choanalyticallore. Through the skin, the psyche turns in on itself and probes into itself,
encapsulating its feeling of itself, particularly in the relations between the fingers and the var-
ious orifices.
Alphonso Lingis (985) has provided us with a brilliant description of the "spirals of
ipseity'; as he calls them, which characterize the unstructured body. The semantic unfolding
of organic surfaces is grounded in a kind of parthenogenic involution and interplay of sensory
experience. But following Deleuze, he autonomizes this autogenic activity, as if the psychic
process had a foundation in a single mechanistic substance, the libido or play of "excitations"
which, like Nietzsche's will, interacts only with itself in one dimension (Lingis 1983, 28-30),
"circulating on the surface of the body without organs" (Lingis 1985,98). But this concept of
libidinal action without interiority reduces the unconscious to the status of an autistic isolate,
with no objects, and without "fecundity'; as Lingis 0985, 110) himself suggests, since it is
sensitive only to itself, and remains unaffected by interaction with anything other than itself
- just as Freud sometimes envisaged the id.
Animals do not as a rule experience things independently of the perception of their own
bodies; and by the same token, enteroception usually occurs in conjunction with exterocep-
tion. Even in the infantile body, 'ipseity' is necessarily a multifactorial process, a way of relat-
ing actively to something else (an object} (Levin 1987a, 34-5; 1987b). There may be such a
thing as pure primary process, but there can be no unadulterated id. Sensory involution never
achieves the closure postulated by the theory of primary narcissism; it always h~s an otherness
- the skin is never able to be simply the skin - the fiction of a purely textual surface - be-
cause it exists in tension with its own depth and limited extension. It gets inside itself, or
'writes' itself onto some other surface, thereby transmuting its own status from the container
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into the contained. For this reason, the skin, like any other figment of the infantile body, is
able to serve as a kind of three-dimensional external object and thus to provide a projective
medium through which the psyche can interact with itself as a whole. In this sense, the skin
may act as the first 'surrogate mother'. It used to be said that the infant related exclusively to
the breast, or to breast-like objects such as the bottle; but we know that even adults find it
difficult to isolate things in this way. The same is true of human infants, no matter how hun-
gry they get. It is not just the mouth that wants to 'incorporate' objects; the eye drinks in,
and from birth, the eye follows the ear.
According to Bakhtin, "the artistic logic of the grotesque image ignores the closed,
smooth, and impenetrable surface of the body and retains only its excrescences (sprouts,
buds) and orifices, only that which leads beyond the body's limited space or into the body's
depths': This is the essence of the piecemeal body - it is always becoming: "It is never fin-
ished, never completed; it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another body.
Moreover, the body swallows the world and is itself swallowed by the world .... This is why
the essential role belongs to those parts of the grotesque body in which it outgrows its own
self .. :' (317 -18). This bawdy relation to the world is subtilized, bur only barely sublimated,
in the vivid conceptual language of Hegel's dialectic of the "inverted world" (203f.) and
"Self-Consciousness" (218ff.).
Gradually, the hands combine with the sensorium, particularly the eyes, to blend the
proximal and distal worlds, to bring things within range of personal boundaries by experi-
menting with the ambiguity of the distinction between the inside and the outside. From the
point of view of general theory, when we try to understand the relation between interiority
and exteriority, we are forced to confront the problem of informal differences - what Hegel
(223) called "substantial differences" - which are neither discrete, nor structured into diacrit-
ical or oppositional relations. The unintegrated body is not just an additive series of binary-
structured desiring machines; there is always a third term, which is implied in the ambiguity
of the inside/ourside distinction itself (just as there would be no possibility of third terms
withour interiority): the line, the border, the gap, the either-or/neither-nor/both-and, which
defines the exact grey area of the psychic process.
Merleau-Ponty (945) claimed that a theory of the body is, ipso facto, already a theory of
perception, and he was, in my opinion, absolutely right in a depth-psychological sense which
no psychoanalytic metapsychology has yet been able to account for. It is easy to be distracted
from the extraordinary sensuality of the psychic process, to forget its vividness in order to
make some point about pain, need, desire, the phallus, power, conflict, morality, and the like.
All of the arguments which Freud, Klein, Lacan, and others make about the facts of psychic
life, sexuality, language, and dependence have been illustrated abundantly in the technical lit-
erature. But rarely does one find any explicit appreciation of the sheer wonderment of
psychosomatic functioning, the utter funktionslust of ordinary being. In this respect, psycho-
analysts are just as uncomprehending as linguistic philosophers and cultural theorists: they
can talk forever about the intricate and seductive strucrures of signification, the ways in
which this body part or that signifier slides into another, corresponds to another, substirutes
for another, refers to another - and they can go on about history and society until everyone is
blue in the face - without really encountering the blunt substance of meaning, the crude
semantic fact of the body, which has no structure in itself, no status within any system of
signification: it just means. 4
People reveal the internal world in various ways, but its internality is never so clearly
evident as it is in the psychoanalytic setting. White (985) has argued that the psycho-
pathological phenomena associated with hysteria in Charcot's day - Freud's 'discovery of
the unconscious' - may be explained as a kind of return of the social repressed. According to
White, the sensuous body of pre-modern societies has been fragmented, marginalized, and
neurotically sublimated in contemporary civilization. He describes a suppressive transforma-
tion of "material, physical practice into purely textual semeosis" (09), in which a robust
communal expression of the body politic has degenerated into a morbid private fantasy. This
insight is pushed into an argument against psychoanalysis, in favour of "a thoroughly his-
toricized, social understanding of mechanisms that Freud mistakenly thought to be more or
less universal" (08). Yet, as Burgin has pointed out 0986, 85-6), "Psychoanalysis does not
construct a realm of the 'subjective' apart from social life': If the internal world is "more or
less universal" [sic}, this is true in the same sense that 'society' is universal: it is an irre-
ducible dimension of human experience, not to be mistaken for an historical construct such
as juridical individualism (Levin 1987a). But one does not have to believe that the internal
world is an ephemeral effect of the historical process to appreciate White's central point -
that the dynamic experience of the social body has been reintrojected and repressed in
industrial civilizations. The situation that we are facing is not so much that the breakdown
of communal life has forced the symbolic universe into a psychic underground (as if uncon-
scious fantasy were a purely modern invention); what has become private, fragmented, and
precarious is not the activity of the internal world (which, if anything, is more public than
ever), but the forms and means of its ritual expression insocial relationships. We can see
now that the therapeutic function in contemporary urban societies is a distillation from
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Carravagio, Sleeping Cupid, 1569 (detail).
traditional social dramaturgy (Diamond 1974); it is bottled and sold in the form of techni-
cal professional healing relationships.
Paradoxically, the aim-inhibited milieu of the psychoanalytic act reveals the primitive
proprioceptive ground of psychic activity in a way which public rituals, such as Greek drama,
nomadic storytelling, spirit possession, trance, peasant carnival, and pagan religion tend to
deflect from attention (cf. Obeyesekere 1981). Derrida (1967) thought that Rousseau was
naive to have yearned so for the collective immediacy of the Festival, and perhaps Derrida was
right in the sense that it is only from the sophisticated, retrospective, fundamentally onanis-
tic, clinical perspective of modems like Sade, Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Freud that the inten-
sity of bodily interaction is missed enough to be appreciated philosophically. If
psycho-analysis is one of the significant practical realizations of modern radical social
thought, this is because (unlike the usual doctrines of revolutionary progress and productivi-
ty) psychoanalysis understands the body as something more than mere socio-historical plastic.
The body becomes, in Hegel's phrase, "substance qua subject" - not just the medium but the
essence of social form (cf. O'Neill 1985).
In support of this point, I would like to draw attention to a tacit dimension of ordinary
psychoanalytic therapy. Much ink has been spilled over the question whether an analyst
should be 'neutral' or interactive with his or her clients. Bur as everyone knows, it is more
important that the analyst be sensitive to detail. Classical analysts were, I believe, just as like-
ly to be personally engaging and directive with their patients as contemporary 'self-psycholo-
gists'. It may not be very good technique to apply the Oedipus model like a grid, or to
dissolve everything the analysand says in a bath of empathic understanding; but it is amazing
what a person at risk with some residual judgment can survive (and even benefit from) if
only there be, on the part of the analyst, a fine-grained receptivity to the nuances of the
psychic process. It is also important to emphasize that before particular qualities of truth,
madness, and even suffering can be perceived and shared, the analyst must be able (at some
level, if only through a kind of unconscious affinity) to experience the exquisiteness of the
analysand. This is not just perversity on the part of the therapist, although the pleasures of
voyeurism certainly help to sustain analytic attention; it is a fundamentally impractical and
amoral strarum of object-related experience, having to do neither with reduction of tension,
nor with redemption through reparation of the object; it is a kind of hypersensitive attune-
ment to the ineradicable current of pleasurable functioning that flows in even the most
painful psychopathology: a purposiveness without purpose. The awareness - or at least the
perception of the affordance - of some linking, some communication, on this aesthetic level
of experience, makes suffering bearable enough to interpret and to work through.
A further word needs to be said about the concept of an impractical and amoral stratum
of object-related experience. Ideas like this are usually associated with the 'id' - an unfettered
libido. But precisely the opposite is the case: the id is quintessentially practical; it presses to-
wards the achievement of its goal, which is always the discharge of an organically-based drive
(the pain principle). As we have seen, the "reality principle" entails little more than a reorgani-
zation of this essentially pragmatic structure of the drive along lines of expediency. In Klein's
system, by contrast, the crisis of the depressive position (the object principle) counterbalances
this id-organization of selfishness. Klein implies that where involvement with others does not
arise out of need, as a secondary drive, it develops morally our of primary anxieties in relation
to the object. In this respect, the Freud-Klein theory of motivation corresponds to a long-
standing system of social-scientific ideas which has led to almost universal condemnation of
the Kantian revolution in aesthetics. However, while Kant's concept of "purposiveness without
purpose" may be impractical and amoral, it does not imply detachment and indifference, as his
critics suggest, but the most rapt interpenetration with the object. Aesthetic reason conjoins
the self and the object, whereas practical and moral reason, in their purposeful schematiza-
tions, detach the subject by means of the 'concept', and thereby isolate the object in the univer-
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sal. As soon as this is understood, the political criticism of Kant's aesthetics (e.g., Hebdige
1987) loses its urgency, for it is precisely upon the aesthetic, in the sense which Kant began to
develop the category (see Marcuse 1955, 159), which the "untheoretical sense of social solidari-
ty" (Hebdige, 67) depends - not practical expediency or moral constraint.
3: BEYOND THE PAIN PRINCIPLE
Now, let us return to the question raised earlier, namely, the problem of how to conceptualize
pleasure in psychodynamic terms which do not convert automatically into Freud's pain prin-
ciple (practical expediency) or Klein's object principle (moral constraint). I think I can offer
you the beginning of an answer to this question, although in order to do so I shall have to
condense a great deal 'of material from psychoanalytic and developmental psychology and
present it in somewhat dogmatic form. The first step is to redefine what we mean by the
term 'dynamic'.
Traditionally, psychodynamic explanation in psychoanalysis has meant conflict between
the earlier, more primitive and the later, more developed forms of psychic functioning. The
secondary processes, among which all psychoanalysts include perception, cognition, memory,
the refinement of affects, and the capacity to defer gratification, are supposed to be derived
from the primary processes (the primary processes being more or less whatever the psycho-
analyst happens to think the drives are like in the state of nature). Unfortunately, this
hypothesis of the derivative character of secondary process types of thinking is incorrect.
From a phylogenetic point of view, it may indeed be true that thinking evolved in order to
insure the satisfaction of the drives. But Freud's assumption that perception, cognition,
memory, and so on, are sublimations of the hungry baby's drive-induced hallucination of sat-
isfaction no longer has much validity. More recent attempts to account for the rise of the ego
by postulating complicated developmental schedules of frustration-gratification are just as
unconvincing (e.g., Margaret Mahler et al.). Lacan's theory of the mirror stage may be placed
in the same category: it is another constructivist allegory of the derivative, superstructural
status of mental phenomena.
The few facts we now have about early development do not refute any of the leading psy-
choanalytic paradigms; but they do offer more encouragement for new directions in research.
My own view is that the traditional emphasis on language as the antidote to infantile solip-
sism and as the principle agent of socialization cannot be pressed much further. It does seem
that the many different characteristics of the so called secondary process are more like inde-
pendent variables than epiphenomenal transformations of the drives. The secondary process
does not derive from the primary process so much as coexist with it, and it seems to do so
from the beginning, as is now being observed in infants days and weeks old. For example, it is
still widely believed that during the first year of life, we only see indistinct patches of colour
in a two dimensional field, and that we are unable to relate what we see to what we hear and
feel, or to recall our experience from moment to moment. Research on object perception and
memory in infancy has quite conclusively refuted this assumption. Although it would be
foolish to deny the epistemological significance of cultural variations in perception and the
interpretation of perception, I do not think it makes much sense any longer to pretend that
organized cognition is simply an arbitrary construction, as if learning to perceive involved
some mysterious transformation of chaos into form, like the old Greek creation myths. There
is no doubt that the infantile body is chaotic and unregulated by comparison to the adult,
conscious body; and that even mature psychic life is treacherous at the best of times. As a
species we rely much more heavily on learning, and on our capacity to internalize the envi-
ronment, than on innate regulatory mechanisms. But it does not follow from this that peri-
natal life consists only of an undifferentiated self or id hovering somewhere beyond time and
space (waiting for the societal influence of concepts and language to come and rescue it).
Piaget was on the wrong track when he concluded that the first year of life is dominated
by solipsism and adualistic confusion.5 Infants perceive objects quite clearly, recognize their
s~parateness, and figure out how to read them months before they have sufficient cortical
control to handle the environment effectively in sensorimotor terms. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, from very early on in posrnatallife, humans relate to other humans socially and emo-
tionally as if they are like beings. As infants, we differentiate among caretakers and strangers
by appearance, voice, and smell; and we remember what people are like even when they are
absent. The tendency to run experiences together, for example to confuse memory with per-
ception, as in the case of Freud's hungry baby, is neither inevitable nor exclusive to the infant
mind - and it is not necessarily a sign of primitive thinking either. The neonate's ability to
imitate and reproduce gestures requires cognitive equipment for intermodal sensory coordina-
tion and representation normally ascribed only to the child of eighteen months or older. I
think it is safe to say that few if any of the components of adult mental functioning are whol-
ly learned, or derived from simpler functions under the pressure of frustration and unpleasure
which characterize the pure forms of motivation in drive psychology and classical behaviour-
istic research. My own view of the infant's hallucinated gratification is that it is first and fore-
most an aesthetic achievement (and the same claim could be made for the transferential
material produced in the analytic process). The hungry baby's alleged denial of reality in fact
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presupposes an intact secondary process, involving perception, cognition, memory, and object-
relatedness. I do not think that the pleasure in the fantasy of gratification lies primarily in
the discharge of drive tension. There is no doubt that the ability to fantasize can be and is
regularly used in order to mask pain. But the processes involved in generating and consolidating an
internal world are pleasurable in themselves. The hungry baby is not regressing to the primitive id;
it is learning to use a kind of intermediary process - to bring the primary and secondary processes
together - in order to think about the situation it is in, to symbolize a state of the body, and to
create a kind of vision.
It is easy to show that the secondary process is not simply an adult unity; but there is
also plenty of evidence that the primary process itself is not a homogeneous, primitive nucle-
us, but a multiplicity of competing and often incompatible capacities and functions. Freud
often wrote as if the unconscious was a disembodied abstraction. But when he said that the id
exists beyond time and space, functioning without regard to the law of contradiction, I think
he was reaching for this sense which I am trying to convey of the sheer primal complexity of
the psyche interacting with itself through the object. All attempts to formulate a unified
theory of the unconscious, or to define the primary process as the simple opposite of rationali-
ty have in my opinion failed (e.g. Matte Blanco). Freud himself adumbrated many shades and
dimensions of primary process activity. It is difficult to imagine how psychoanalysis could get
off the ground without assuming unconscious perception in time and space, unconscious
memory, unconscious emotion, and unconscious cognition. But these are all embodied pro-
cesses, and they are qualitatively differentiated to a high degree. Most contemporary analysts
get around this problem by talking about unconscious ego functioning, but this is just anoth-
er way of admitting that the originary, unitary id is a fiction, and that psychoanalysis has
never been in a position to assert the existence of one, supraordinate dynamic principle of the
mind. In the notion of primary process, we must include the unconscious as the seat of the
drives; the unconscious as the intermediary between the environment and the hidden recesses
of the body, the lining of the stomach, the glands, organs, ducts, and corridors of the interior
soma; the unconscious as the repository of the repressed; as dynamic, "unbound" energy; as
a form of thinking, in which memories, ideas, images, emotions, and desires are fused, circu-
lated, split up again, recycled, displaced, and generally worked over, yielding eccentric repre-
sentations of the psychic state in consciously retrieved dream and fantasy; the unconscious as
animal perception not only of the self, but of the internal states of other living bodies; and
finally, there is the way in which this all seems to come together in the primary process as a
sort of bizarre, plasticizing, conative organ of intermodal sense.
The infantile body has an internal world, an inner region of experience mediated by self
and object perception, by means of which it is constantly translating one type of experience
into another. Hallucinating, fantasizing, and dreaming, however unrealistic, however domi-
nated by the imperious wish, however driven by the avoidance of pain, all depend upon the
capacity to relate sensation to cognition, and to let the body come together and fall apart
again in ceaseless reconfigurations of psychosoma. I do not think it is stretching a point to
say that the plasticity and divisibility of the body in general are preconditions of psychic pro-
cess. Thinking is a multiplicity of translations, which would be impossible if the body were
not always potentially in pieces. But if this is so, then thinking has to be a pleasure before it
can be a pain. Its object has to be loved by the senses before it can be devoured and incorpo-
rated in an oral panic; and the functioning of the body has to be treasured, offered to the
world, before it can be denied, projected outwards in terrorized flight from the uncertainty of
expenence.
I am suggesting that psychodynamics must first be understood as multiple, reciprocal
interaction, in which many parts, capacities, and functions jointly condition one another and
collectively fashion the overall pattern Freud called psyche. Parts of this pattern normally
achieve relative stability, while others do not, and certain functions come to be grouped
together to form such entities as ego and superego. But even the sustained psychic formations
remain volatile processes requiring periodic unintegration and redefinition. As Anton
Ehrenzweig (967) has argued, the aesthetic law of the psyche is dedifferentiation of figure
and ground, a kind of anti-Gestalt, or perpetual violation of the principles of good form. This
is not the absence of perception, but the presence of that which escapes dichotomization and
hierarchization into figure and ground - in short, that which escapes defensive splitting and
idealization. Now, if I am right in saying that psychodynamics must first be understood as
joint action before it can be reduced to conflict between what is supposed to be primary and
what is supposed to be derived from it - if the object is already perceived and enjoyed before
the organism has had a chance to recoil from pain; if the external world is fundamentally
accepted before it can be turned into a practical alternative to the internal world; if reality is
not just a construction designed to supplement the intellectual poverty of the drive - then I
think it follows that the first meaning of the term dynamic has to be an aesthetic one, and the
first definition of the aesthetic has to be pleasure in the unintegrated body.
I have argued that the dynamic psychic process is not just drive versus defence, supple-
mented later on by the object, as psychoanalysts sometimes claim, but more fundamentally, a
sort of intermediary process. In this regard, as I am sure you have already guessed, I am aligning
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my own speculations with some of the implications of the philosophical concept of play. In
contrast to Winnicott (1971), however, I do not think that play emerges in a transitional
stage of development bridging the oblivion of primary narcissism with objective perception -
it is primordial. Nor do I entirely agree with Lacan and Derrida when they argue that play
subordinates presence to absence. I should also say something about the Enlightenment
thinkers, Kant, Schiller, and of course, Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Much of what still needs to
be explored in the psychic process was anticipated in Kant's theory of judgment as the free
play of imagination and understanding. Bur we must assume that this activity of the "facul-
ties" encompasses a wider field of mental phenomena than Kant or the Romantic poets could
imagine. In general, however, it seems fair to suggest the following provisional formulation:
the play of the psyche involves an interpenetration of the pleasure in functioning with plea-
sure in the object. It is as if the environment is somehow introjected into the infrasensory (in-
termodal) spheres of the body, whilst proprioception is simultaneously projected back into
the field of perception and cognition. At any rate, this is one way of defining the symbolic
process: the body interacting simultaneously with itself and its objects.
The always thorny problem of psychic defence will serve as a closing example. Splitting,
projection, identification, repression, displacement, condensation, and the like, are all fre-
quently cited as typical examples of primitive, primary process thinking. On the other hand,
all these supposedly irrational mechanisms, including displacement and condensation, have
been described as straightforward forms of ego defence. So which is it to be: primary process
or secondary process, id or ego? I think the confusion lies in our failure to theorize the aes-
thetic substratum of psychic process. Splitting, for example, surely presupposes perceptual
and cognitive discrimination; it cannot be the unconscious origin of differential thinking, but
one of the symbolic elaborations of it. The capacity to split, to safeguard the desirable by
dividing it from the undesirable, rests on the capacity to recognize differences, which is a
pleasure in itself, as experiments based on stimulus habituation demonstrate over and over
again. The secondary defence against a primary process activity is always a product of
symbolic activities already in place; that is, the primary and the secondary processes are
developments from intermediary processes. The so called laws of unconscious mentation,
condensation, displacement (metaphor, metonymy), the mobility of cathexes, and the suspen-
sion of the laws of time, space, and contradiction are all forms of symbolization: they presup-
pose the whole psychic apparatus, including perception, cognition, memory, differentiation,
deferral, and the ego itself: nothing can take. place in the psyche, nothing in the mind can be
dynamic, unless it is already caught up in a symbolic elaboration.
Now, let me take another, more speculative step. If there is indeed such a thing as an
intermediary process, it must, I think by definition, be an emergent process: that is, if all of the
components of mental functioning are already in place, organically, from sensation to cogni-
tion, and from memory to hallucination, as I have claimed, then the psyche obviously does
not start out as a unitary nucleus, an originary atom, which develops eventually into a variety
of functions; it is already a kind of overflow, an excess, an interactional effect of the piecemeal
body. In this sense, psychological life contains within its precarious, intersubjectively sus-
tained being, a significant element of indetermination. On this point, I must agree emphati-
cally with the deconstructionists. One cannot deduce from the neurobiopsychological
copresence of consciousness, perception, cognition, affect, and drive the exact parameters of
the activity which will transmute them all into what Freud called collectively the psyche.
The initial, multiple state of the psychesoma only comes into existence when its combined
effects have begun to emerge; and it is this emergent property which constitutes the substance
of subjective experience. In short, I agree that subjectivity is in itself merely an effect; but I
do not agree that it is simply an ideological, or metaphysical effect.
Let us recall again Freud's speculation in The Interpretation 0/Dreams that the first internal
psychic event must necessarily have been a compensatory response to the unpleasure of drive
tension. The baby is unfed, so it resurrects the memory of satisfaction - the lost object - and
fulfils the aim of the drive by means of hallucinatory gratification. As I mentioned in passing,
this little story contains the essence of the psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of
art. The writings of Fairbairn, Klein, Winnicott, Milner, and Ernst Kris, to mention only the
most famous psychoanalytic aestheticians, are all variations on this theme. According to Freud,
the first meaningful internal psychic event is a substitution for the real thing. And so goes art,
play, and the aesthetic impulse: they are reactions, substitutions, compensations. A great deal
has been made of this in recent years - too much, I believe. Of course, we might lift a page
from Marcuse (972), and speak of art as a substitution, not for reality, but for something that
is missing in reality, something which could and should be there. This is a utopian formulation
of Freud which unfortunately has lately fallen into disrepute in academic circles. Marcuse's
idea was that the political function of art is to open out a kind of custodial space for the ideal,
to preserve within the safe confines of beautiful illusion the repressed possibilities of the fu-
ture. Although I have always subscribed to this perspective, I think it involves too rational
(too adultopmorphic) a conception of the aesthetic to serve as a baseline for critical social
theory. In the end, the deconstructionists are probably closer to the spirit of the infantile body
- the 'inverted world' - than was Marcuse. But I stick to my argument that substitution
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theory has offered us only a one-dimensional conception of the aesthetic impulse, implying a
false reduction of pleasure to secondary and derivative status. In saying this, I do not intend
merely to reverse Freud's hierarchy, in order to show that pain is somehow derived from plea-
sure. Nor am I denying that pain can turn into pleasure, and pleasure into pain. I am only
asserting that it is false to infer from the phenomenon of transformation of affect that pleasure
and pain, or for that matter, love and hate, are mutually exclusive, inversely proportional
opposites. It seems to me more likely that pleasure and pain are equally powerful experiences
with distinct psychobiological foundations. They usually coexist in varying degrees of admix-
ture. But the capacity to generate internal pleasure - whatever its evolutionary status - is
ontogenetically primary: without it, there can be no psychic process, no organismic gain from
symbolization. Fantasy - and art - may serve as substitutes for reality and as masks for pain;
and perhaps in the final analysis there is no other reality than substitution; but if biological re-
sponsibility for pleasure in experience lay entirely at the doorstep of the pain principle, psychic
reality would long ago have slipped into oblivion. In Darwinian terms, it is hard to see how
life would have evolved simply as a reaction to the goad of unpleasure and the necessity for de-
ferral. Surely intelligent life would have given up under these conditions, which is probably
why Freud (1920) felt it necessary to counterpose Thanatos with a cosmic Eros. In so
doing, however, he admitted my thesis: that there must be a pleasure principle which is not
simply the obverse of the pain principle. I have argued that this more fundamental pleasure
principle is anchored at the intermodallevel of the body, which is present in early infancy: sen-
sation, perception, proprioception, affect, memory, and cognition, the interplay of which gen-
erates the psychic process of symbolization. The psychic body is first of all aesthetic experience.
The practicality of Freud's pain-reality principle and the morality of Klein's object principle
both presuppose this pleasurable tubbing together of the body's various innate dispositions -
the pieces of the body - as they move outward in search of the world.
1. By 'aesthetics' I mean (to use a phrase of Freud's) "not merely the theory of beauty but the theory of
rhe qualities of feeling" (Freud 1919,219).
2. In psychoanalytic discourse, the term 'external' is best read as if it meant 'beyond omniporent [subjec-
tive} control'. The developmental vicissitudes of this issue have been handled with especial sensitivity by
Winnicott (971).
3. In the terms of formal aesthetics, the problem I am raising is illustrated rather nicely by Peter Fuller in
his discussion of the Venus de Milo; and by the suggestive silences which enliven Leo Steinberg's historical ex-
amination of the sexuality of Christ in Renaissance art.
4. But in the best technical formulations, the aesthetic phenomena which presumably correspond in
some way to the concepts of pleasure, experience, and drive remain latent and thus become accessible to re-
flective observation.
5. See in particular the articles by Butterworth and by Meltzoff & Moore in Lipsitt 0983, 1-29; 265-
301); and O'Neill (982).
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